Whilst the reports on the war - the progress of American troops, the loss of civilian lives, etc. were full of contradictions and lies, here we look at one specific aspect of this black war - the lies and misinformation used by the invaders with the aim of dividing and disuniting the Muslims in Iraq This war against Islam and for the consolidation of the American empire is not over, we Muslims must learn the lessons from these early encounters if we are to triumph in the end.

The Invasion

Ayatullah Seestani office denies fatwa attributed to him

By: Jawad Saanayi, Mash'had, Iran
Jafariy News

GA statement issued from the office of Grand Ayatullah Ali As-Seestani said that the religious ruling, or fatwa attributed to him in which it was said that the grand Ayatullah As-Seestani has called upon the Iraqi people not to stand against US invading forces neither hinder them, is not true.

According to the statement, Grand Ayatullah As-Seestani’s office was contacted by a number of channels about the fatwa and all found it “untrue”.

Heah Ulamail Islam Al-Iraqia’s Hazrat Hujjatul Islam Ash-Sheikh Hadi Al-Khalsi has denied the existence of any proof that such type of fatwa was issued by Grand Ayatullah As-Seestani, for Shariah makes it obligatory to stand in the face of invasion (defence is obligatory) and upon the same all Maraje Ad-Diniyah (religious authorities) are agreed.

Khalsi alleged the group, which issued the baseless news (fatwa), that it has been in co-operation with the enemy (allied forces) since years. He said the famous fatwa by Ayatullah Seestani is “Hurmatut Ta’amul Ma’al Aa’daa (any type of work with enemy is forbidden)’

extracts taken from Jane's Defense Website article:

Iraq's unknown future: the Shi'a factor

J.Daly,
Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst 24 April 2003

As the USA tries to establish a post-Saddam democratic regime in Iraq, Washington's ultimate nightmare scenario is that the Shi'as, largely locked out of power since the accession of the Ba'athists in 1968, will assert themselves politically and deliver the country to fundamentalism through democratic elections.

In an incident of ominous portent for the coalition forces, Shi'a cleric Seyyed Abdul Majid al-Khoei was killed in Najaf at the Imam Ali mosque on 10 April. Al-Khoei had returned from London seven days earlier, where he had fled after the failed Shi'a uprising against Saddam in 1991.

According to the Al-Khoei Foundation in London, Al-Khoei saw his colleague and fellow cleric Haidar al-Kadar set on by a crowd and went to his aid. Al-Kadar had been responsible for the shrine under Saddam's ministry of religion and was, therefore, regarded as tainted. According to eyewitnesses, Al-Khoei pulled a gun and fired several shots in an attempt to defend Al-Kadar, after which the crowd killed both men. Al-Khoei's nephew Jawad said that a total of six people were killed in the tumult, including a US special forces officer assigned as a bodyguard; the officer's colleagues apparently remained outside the shrine as a mark of respect.

In retrospect, the incident was foreshadowed by several disturbing events. Grand ayatollahs Mirza Ali Sistani and Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim had refused to meet with Al-Khoei, a snub intended to indicate their disapproval for his close association with the coalition forces. Al-Hakim had spent his period of exile in Iran, while Sistani had stayed in Iraq ministering to the faithful.

The disparity between exile views was illuminated when Al-Khoei visited Iran shortly before the opening of the US campaign in mid-March, where demonstrators shouted "go back to America". After the US campaign began, Al-Khoei urged Shi'as to stay off the streets and not oppose the foreign forces. The perception of Al-Khoei as a US puppet was strengthened by the fact that he was usually accompanied by US special forces, who provided security.

Worse was to come. On 16 April, Ayatollah Seyyed Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, deputy leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), arrived to a hero's welcome in Kut, attended by thousands of his supporters. SCIRI is not co-operating with US plans for post-war Iraq, and boycotted the US-sponsored meeting in Nasiriyah on 15 April because it did not regard the meeting as legitimate on the grounds of the presence of 'outsiders'.

Al-Hakim said: "We refuse to put ourselves under the thumb of the Americans or any other country, because that it not in the Iraqis' interest." Worse, Al-Hakim noted that US threats against Syria and Iran only inflamed the Middle East.

Islamic leader blames US for the chaos

By Roula Khalaf in Najaf,
Financial Times April 18 2003

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highly influential Iraqi Shia cleric, on Friday criticised what he called the "foreign domination" over Iraq and blamed the US-led coalition for the lack of security that provoked chaos after the fall of the regime.

Calling on the US to allow Iraqis to rule themselves, the ayatollah's spokesman, a son, said foreign troops had paved the way for chaos to replace the regime of Saddam Hussein.

"Why didn't they [the US forces] put a tank in front of the national museum as they put one in front of the oil ministry?" Mr al-Sistani, speaking at the house of the Ayatollah in Naj af, asked the FT.

"The current situation is one of chaos, lack of security and foreign domination."

Lamenting the loss of Iraq's national treasures and the looting of public buildings, universities and the national library in Baghdad, he said: "They opened the way for disorder and l ooting so they can control the country."

The religious official spoke as thousands of Iraqis demonstrated in the streets of Baghdad after the first Friday sermons since the fall of the regime. As some clerics lashed out at the US, protestors called for the establishment of an Islamic state.

Ayatollah Sistani is considered by many Iraqis to be the highest Shia authority in the country. His criticism is a blow to US efforts to win the confidence of the population in the po stwar transition and a sign of strong resistance to US plans to lead an interim Iraqi administration.

That the oil ministry was among the few public buildings in Baghdad to be saved from destruction - US forces say they it was looted but they were able to secure it before any attempt to burn it - has aggravated suspicions about US intentions.

The spokesman for the ayatollah suggested that the key principle - that Iraqis should rule themselves - had yet to be established and he warned that no one but Iraqis should be allowe d to make decisions on the oil industry.

"At this stage the principle must be established: We have to leave Iraq to Iraqis. This is the key issue. One moment of domination is not acceptable," he said.

While some observers fret that the country will disintegrate if left too soon to its own people, the spokesman warned that US control over Iraq would provoke internal unrest.

"There are political parties and movements in Iraq; if Iraqis are not allowed a role themselves, there are dangers of divisions, of contradictions, and of infighting," he said.

He said the ayatollah had not issued any fatwas, or religious edicts, to guide Shias in their attitude towards the war or its aftermath, denying a claim by the US army that he had asked followers not to hinder the advance of US troops.

"That was not true. There were no fatwas issued since the beginning of the war except one - it was against looting of public property," said the spokesman.

Mr Sistani said the lack of security left the ayatollah and his entourage in danger. But he denied reports that the senior cleric's house had been besieged by radicals last week. He explained that the ayatollah had decided to stop seeing visitors, in protest against the recent killings in the holy shrine of Imam Ali including that of Abdelmajid al-Khoi, a cleric recently returned from London and backed by the US.

The Pentagon's Plan For The Shia

by Lawrence F. Kaplan
The New Republic
2 May 2003

Last week, the United States confronted a philosophical dilemma. Responding to televised images of angry Iraqis denouncing the United States, a chorus of Arab diplomats and American pundits warned that democracy in Iraq could lead to, well, theocracy in Iraq. Yet the Bush team seemed unfazed. When asked about the potential for clerical rule in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded, "That isn't going to happen."

"The bottom line," explains a senior State Department official, "is we control the purse strings, the appointments, and anything else of political value [in postwar Iraq]. Not just anyone is going to get access to this." The membership of a soon-to-be-organized Iraqi coordinating council will be vetted by American officials and "stacked" with friendly voices, particularly those belonging to the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Updating the Nixon Doctrine for Iraq, Pentagon officials intend the organization to fight political battles that Washington would rather not—marginalizing anti-American clerics and politicians without visible U.S. involvement. (Alas, this will do nothing to diminish the not entirely inaccurate perception of the INC as a U.S. proxy.)

Nor will Shia extremists have an opportunity to seize power through the ballot box, at least not any time soon. Members of the Bush team claim that, prior to any referendum, a constitution must be drawn up, an assembly convened, judicial reform enacted—all under the auspices of liberal Iraqis with close ties to the United States. Further, that constitution will include clauses designed to impede the rise of illiberal forces—among these, the diffusion of national power along federal lines, detailed arrangements for sharing that power in Baghdad, perhaps a ban on "totalitarian" political parties, and a commitment to regular elections. Those elections, moreover, will be held on a "rolling" basis, beginning at the municipal level and proceeding only slowly toward the Iraqi center. In the meantime, American officials hope an influx of financial and humanitarian assistance will diminish Shia resentments in Iraq's south. And, when elections do come, administration officials predict that a more discrete and narrowly tailored influx of "aid" will give liberal forces an advantage. Special Forces and CIA officers have already fanned out across Iraq's south to bolster and create moderate Shia voices. Covert assistance may even be channeled to Shia clerics...

Cleric's Killing a Setback to U.S.
CIA lost an ally and $13M

By Knut Royce
WASHINGTON BUREAU, Newsday

May 2, 2003

Washington - The United States suffered a major blow in its campaign to recruit friendly Shia clerics inside Iraq last month when it lost an influential religious ally to an angry mob - and up to $13 million the CIA had given him to cultivate supporters.

While he was widely perceived to be pro-American, Iraqis were unaware that the cleric, Abdel Majid al-Khoei, had agreed to use the CIA cash in a covert program to enlist support within the splintered Shia community, according to knowledgeable U.S. sources.

Al-Khoei and a pro-Saddam Hussein religious leader were stabbed to death on April 10 in front of a mosque in the holy city of Najaf by an angry mob reportedly backing competing Shia clergy.

Witnesses to the slaying said that as al-Khoei was being stabbed, a number of $100 and $50 bills in U.S. currency spilled out of his clerical robes. "There was some American money flying around with lots of blood on it," said one of the witnesses, who asked not to be identified for fear of retribution. "The money was hidden in his clothes, and that made the crowd even angrier at him."

Al-Khoei's pro-American sympathies were no secret, and he had returned to Iraq from exile in London several days earlier with the assistance of U.S. troops, who provided a constant escort as he traveled through Najaf. He had urged the Shia community to support the U.S. war to topple Hussein and on the day he was killed was preaching reconciliation with former Hussein backers.

The U.S. government clearly saw in al-Khoei a valuable asset in enlisting support among Shia, who, though splintered, have become increasingly vocal in their calls for the U.S. military to leave Iraq.

And the covert operation underscores the high stakes involved in America's efforts to establish a postwar government coalition of competing factions that is democratic and sympathetic to Western values. Some of the country's 16 million Shia, who constitute 60 percent of the population, want an Islamic state.

"We allocated $13 million to the al-Khoei operation," said a well-placed intelligence source. "It was part of a covert action program to strengthen Shiites who are pro- Western" and to recruit new allies.

"I don't know where the $13 million is," he said. "... A good chunk of it is missing."

An administration official familiar with the CIA's operation declined to discuss how much money may have been lost or retrieved. Asked whether the cash may have been a motive behind the killing, he said, "I guess you can't rule it out, but I doubt it."

The administration official described the loss of al-Khoei as a "significant" setback to U.S. efforts to counter Iranian influence within the Shia clergy and to cultivate a moderate, if not necessarily pro-American, bloc within the community.